The Tragedy Of The 728 JET - Never Built Regional Competitor

Imagine building a plane from scratch, only to be betrayed by your airline customer, go bankrupt and destroy the prototype weeks before your first flight... this is the biggest what-if in regional aviation, the story for the Fairchild Dornier 728. In today’s video we will see what the 728 was like, which airline betrayed the builders and ultimately, why was it never built? Let’s explore. The story of the Fairchild Dornier 728 doesn’t start with Fairchild at all, in fact, it starts with another plane entirely, the turboprop Dornier 328; This regional jet had twin propellers and was considered not a bad aircraft, but just not very exciting. It was originally created as a modern answer to the 30-seater market in Europe, and was considered the most advantageous turboprop of the early 90s. Thanks to its high altitude and cruise speed, it was just as efficient as jet-engines and burned significantly less fuel. It was perfectly suited for point-to-point regional travel, and marketed across Europe and to Western USA. In 1991 it secured a huge order with Horizon Air for 35 aircraft. So why did I say it wasn’t exciting? Well in the early 90s, the latest hot thing was a regional jet, not a regional turbo prop. That, plus a crowded turboprop market, many with more seats, pushed the company to lose a ton of money. How much? the German Dornier lost $337 million (DM499 million) in 1995. So what was the solution? A 328JET would be faster than any other regional jet, and outperform even the turboprop with jet engines. At the same time enters our hero of the Story, Fairchild Aviation. This American firm had created the A-10 Warthog that had huge success in the gulf war with its signature sound. The firm acquired the lagging Donier and its 328JET program with some ambitious programs indeed. After all, why focus on just the 30 seater market when what airlines really wanted was a 100-seater profit machine. This is what they came up with. The 728 series would take what worked with the 328JET program and improve on it dramatically. Offically the 728-100 was to have a passenger capacity of 70 to 85 seats. The 728 had the largest cabin in its class. Interestingly, this five seating arrangement was at the request of Lufthansa who didn’t want a low-cost carrier to come in with the same plane, slap in 6 seats, and beat them in their own market. And a 750 km (400 NM) increase in range up to 3,300 km (1,781 nm) But why stop there? Why not stretch the 728 further into the 928? The 928 had a stretched fuselage that would have enabled the aircraft to achieve a passenger capacity of 95 to 110 seats. The 928 featured an increased wingspan and more powerful engines. A 928-100 version, as well as a 928-200 version that had an increased maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), was planned, with a range of 3,565 km 1,925 nm. Lastly, the team also proposed a shink of the 728 into the 528, to bridge the gap between the currently under development 328. The 528 was to have a shortened m (76 ft 9 in) fuselage length with a Passenger capacity of 55 to 65 seats to a range of 2,963 km (1,600 nm). There was also the 1128JET, seating up to 120 passengers. There was also a business jet version called the Envoy 7, that could fly from Europe to the USA without refueling! It was a big success, and by June 2001, it was reported that leasing firm GECAS placed a firm order for 50 aircraft, By early 2002, a total of eight customers, among them Lufthansa Cityline, GECAS, Bavaria Leasing, CSA-Czech Airlines, Atlantic Coast Airlines, and SolAir, had reportedly placed a cumulative 125 firm orders for the type, as well as signed options for an additional 164 aircraft. So.. what the hell happened? Flash forward to March 2002, and only two days before the 728 would taxi around the airport for the first time under its own power, the firm revealed that the program would have a pause for two months as it found additional funds. In a huge blow to finding additional capital, both Lufthansa and the air leasing firm GECAS pulled out, making the program far from profitable. Low-cost carriers who had been interested at the time pulled out, as the cabin was not reconfigurable for high-density seating - thanks Lufthansa. In the end, the three prototypes were scrapped, or used for other engineering purposes - not for their maiden mission of flying passengers but rather serving as a warning to anyone else willing to try and enter the regional market. If these planes had been flown and successful in the market, you could have imagined that this firm would have gone on to dominate in the regional space, pushing out the A220 and perhaps even biting at Airbus and Boeing. Due to its close relationship with DASA, one of the firms that worked with Airbus, its possible it would have eventually been bought by the firm and become part of the greater international network. Or, in my mind, they struck on their own and created their own small jet taking on the world.